The Bangsa Moro: fighting for freedom during the war on terror: the Muslim Independence Movement of the Southern Philippines by East, Bob
  
  
  
  
  
The Bangsa Moro: Fighting for Freedom During 
the War on Terror: The Muslim Independence 
Movement of the Southern Philippines  
  
  
Bob East  
University of Southern Queensland  
  
  
  
Paper presented to the Social Change in the 21st 
Century Conference  
  
Centre for Social Change Research  
Queensland University of Technology  
28 October 2005  
 
 
 
  
  
The Bangsa Moro: Fighting for Freedom During the War on Terror: The Muslim 
Independence Movement of the Southern Philippines.  
  
Bob East  
University of Southern Queensland  
  
  
  
  
  
Preface  
  
  
Bangsa Moro is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which 
constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao,(and the southern archipelago islands of Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu and Basilan, all in all approximately 4.5 million Muslims)   
  
In 1905 Dr. Najeeb M Saleeby wrote in a book Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion, ‘the 
Moros are a law-abiding people, provided, however, they feel that the government that rules them 
is their own. They do not regard the present government as their own’. One hundred years on, the 
same sentiments persists with the majority of Bangsa Moro people of the Southern Philippines.   
  
Prior to the original Spanish landing in the Philippines by the Portuguese navigator Ferdinand 
Magellan in 1521, the population, consisting of Muslims and animistic tribes people, lived in a 
symbiotic relationship. However this was to change with the introduction of Christianity by Spain. 
As a result of the Christian imposition, war and hostilities occurred. The start of hostilities began 
with the first Muslim Filipino/Spaniard clash near Cebu in 1569.  When the United States of 
America acquired the Philippines in 1898, following the Treaty of Paris, the Muslim population in 
the Philippines had in all but Mindanao, and a few islands in the Philippine archipelago, been 
either eliminated or converted to Christianity. The resolve of the Muslim Bangsa Moro, for self-
determination or independence has survived to this date, despite the impact of Spanish 
colonization, American imperialism, Japanese invasion, and Philippine industrialization.   
  
The Bangsa Moro of the Southern Philippines would, if allowed, live according to Sharia law. This 
in itself promotes a conflict of interest, because Philippine law has as its authority the Philippine 
Constitution, and ‘the Philippine Constitution still hovers above the Koran’ (Vitag & Gloria 2000). 
There is no government policy which clearly discriminates against Muslims in Mindanao, however 
policies are formulated in response to popular demand, and since the majority of the population 
are Christians, ‘policies can be biased in favour of the majority’ (Lingga 2004).   
  
  
Research Methodology:  
  
  
 This paper was researched using data drawn from primary and secondary sources. This included 
text analysis, statistical data, observations, ethnographic studies and personal communication 
from major players,   
  
  
Introduction  
  
  
An article in the Economist, in 2003, started with the statement: “when you check in for a flight to 
the island of Mindanao, in the Southern Philippines, the airline staff ask why you would want to go 
to such an awful spot. It is, after all, one of the few places, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
America has sent troops to take on terrorism”.    
  
This paper chronologically traces the various hostile events and the subsequent peace attempts 
from 1972 to the present time (2005). The paper will attempt to answer why past peace 
negotiations were unsuccessful and what was the catalyst for the resumption of hostilities. As well 
the paper will try to determine why a sustainable peace in Mindanao involving its Muslim minority 
population was unattainable during the five Philippine administrations from 1972. They were, 
Ferdinand Marcos to February 1986, Corazon Aquino: February 1986- June 1992, Fidel Valdez 
Ramos: June 1992- May 1998, Joseph Estrada: may1998- January 2001, and Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo: January 2001- present time. Finally an analysis of the current peace talks, initiated by the 
USIP and currently being held in Malaysia will be made together with an analytical prediction of 
possible outcomes.   
  
  
To better understand why peace in the Southern Philippines has been so elusive this paper will be 
divided into six episodes. They are [1] Introduction, [2] Historical Background to Hostilities, [3] Past 
Peace Initiatives, [4] Current Peace Talks, [5] International Implications, and [6] Concluding 
Thoughts. Episodes [2] and [3] address historical issues and attempts to explain of why peace was 
so illusive. Episode [4] deals exclusively with the exploratory talks between the GRP and MILF 
which started in March 2003. Episode [5] addresses contemporary issues and questions relating to 
the relationship between the current peace talks and the “War on Terror”. And the conclusion will 
give three scenarios which may bring a political answer to this long-standing conflict.   
  
  
Although the Bangsa Moro have been engaged in hostilities with various foreign and Philippine 
administrations since that first clash near Cebu in 1569, it took the imposition of martial law by 
President Ferdinand Marcos in September 1972, citing Muslim secessionists as one of the two 
biggest threats to national security, to act as the catalyst for an “organized” resistance by the 
Muslims of the Southern Philippines. However Marcos failed to disclose that the true reason for 
Muslim unrest, especially since the time of independence, (notwithstanding the earlier Spanish 
anti-Moro attitude), was the systematic minoritization and marginalization of the Bangsa Moro in 
the Southern Philippines, achieved by foreign education, and Christian immigration from the 
Northern Philippines. Whilst the percentage of Muslims in the Philippines has remained virtually 
static, the ratio of non-Muslims to Muslims in the Southern Philippines has risen.   
  
 Despite the Philippines having five administrations since 1972, and three major peace 
agreements and accords negotiated with the Bangsa Moro, together with a number of cease fires, 
the latest beginning in 2003, the situation still remains tense. However in May 2003, the U.S. 
deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage announced that the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP), would initiate and facilitate peace negotiations, (referred to as GRP-MILF Exploratory 
Talks) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). These latest peace talks may hold the key to settling the question of 
Muslim ancestral domain, in the Southern Philippines.   
  
  
Historical Background of Hostilities  
  
  
The Moro Wars 1569 to 1762  
  
  
The confrontations which occurred between the Spanish and the Muslims in the Philippines from 
1569 to 1762 were known as the Moro Wars. These wars were to last until 1762 when the British 
successfully invaded Manila.   
  
  
1762 to 1898  
  
  
Coinciding with the last two decades of the Moro Wars a revolt lasting eighty-five years 
(1744-1829) occurred on the island of Bohol in the Visayas. From 1829 until 1898 an uneasy truce 
was in existence between the Spanish and the Muslims of the Philippines, Although there was 
period in the mid to late 1890s, referred to as the “Philippine Revolutionary War” when Andres 
Bonifacio had limited success against the Spanish, the Muslims were not involved.    
            
1898 to 1968  
  
From 1899 to 1913, a series of protracted military campaigns were conducted against the Muslims 
of Lanao, and Cotabato, by American forces. (America had acquired the Philippines after the 1898 
Spanish-American war) At the same time the Muslims in other areas of Mindanao were having 
their influence eroded by a massive inflow of Christian settlers under a government resettlement 
programme which was only stalled by the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1941.  
  
  
Events Leading up to the 1972 Declaration of Martial Law  
  
  
March 18, 1968 was a day which signaled to the Bangsa Moro just how expendable their youth 
was to further the aspirations of the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. This 
day saw the murder of dozens of young Filipino army recruits on Corregidor Island in Luzon. This 
murderous event was referred to as the Jabidah massacre. These young Filipino Muslims recruits 
discovered all too late their true mission in training, was to fight fellow Muslims in Sabah (northern 
Borneo), which would have involved killing their own Tausag and Sama relatives living there 
(Whitman 2005).   
  
The “Jabidah” massacre was widely recognized as the catalyst for the formation of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF). The Bangsa Moro of the Southern Philippines now had an 
organisation which had as its key issue, self-determination. The first chairman of the MNLF was 
Nur Misuari, a lecturer at the Manila University. He had been a supporter of Mindanao Muslim 
separatism in his student days and now could realise his dream by heading a popular front for the 
liberation of his fellow Muslims in the Southern Philippines.  
   
In a complex matrix of events, including further violence against Muslims, in massacres at Upi, 
Ampatuan, Manili, and Buldun by Filipino Christians, and political interference from the Marcos 
administration in local elections in Cotabato, the Bangsa Moro felt there was no alternative but to 
resist with organised paramilitary action.  As the escalation of violence continued in Mindanao, 
foreign players came onto the scene. In the United Nations, Libyan president, Muammar al-
Qaddafi accused the Philippine government of genocide and threatened to give aid to the 
Philippine Muslims. In September 1972, citing Muslim secessionists as one of the two biggest 
threats to national security and quoting themes of communist conspiracy, President Ferdinand 
Marcos imposed martial law.   
  
After four centuries of struggle the Bangsa Moro were still no closer to peace and independence. 
They also now had to contend with an administration obsessed with their destruction.   
  
Past Peace Initiatives   
  
   
The 1976 Tripoli Agreement   
  
  
If President Marcos thought the declaration of martial law in 1972 would in some way, by force 
perhaps, see the elimination of the Bangsa Moro paramilitary forces, or the waning of Muslim 
enthusiasm for self-determination, then he, like his presidential predecessors, Roxas, Quirino, 
Magsaysay, Garcia, and Macapagal, underestimated the resolve of the Bangsa Moro. Marcos, 
disillusioned or frustrated at being unable to use the military for roles other than the traditional 
ones of defending the national territory and securing national sovereignty, was now able to use the 
military for regime support and to help implement governmental policy which included suppression 
of the Bangsa Moro separatist movement (Miranda 1985). However, rather than suppressing the 
Bangsa Moro movement, martial law had the opposite effect. Areas of support spread to other 
Southern Philippine provinces such as Zamboanga (del Norte and del Sur), Sulu and 
Maguindanao. As well condemnation of Marcos’ action also came from the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC).   
  
Whilst Bangsa Moro military units were engaged in combat with the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP), executive leaders of the MNLF were engaged in dialogue with Libya. In addition 
to all the international attention the Bangsa Moro was receiving, in July 1975, at the “Sixth Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers”, held in Jeddah, the MNLF was given formal recognition by the 
OIC. Meanwhile, this “civil war” dragged on, and by December 1976, the majority of the AFP 
strength was being used in Mindanao to fight the Bangsa Moro paramilitary. Such was the carnage 
and mayhem, that it is estimated, that somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000 lives were lost, 
and 300,000 were made refugees, of which 200,000 fled to Sabah, Malaysia (Alim 1995 Faced 
with international pressure, and growing military causalities, Marcos reluctantly agreed to negotiate 
with representatives of the MNLF, and have representatives of the OIC act as interlocutors and 
conciliators. However, what is puzzling about the preparations for this historic occasion was the 
decision by Marcos to send to Libya as head of the pre-negotiating team his wife, Imelda Marcos 
in lieu of Defence Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile. Moreover, at the peace negotiations in Tripoli in 
December 1976 Enrile was “excluded”., However a peace agreement was signed in Tripoli on 
December 1976, and granted full autonomy to thirteen provinces of the Southern Philippines This 
only left eight provinces, mainly in the north and north-east of Mindanao, which would not have 
“Muslim” autonomy. At last peace and stability in the Southern Philippines seemed a possibility. 
However, future events were to prove this wrong, and before too long hostilities recommenced.   
  
The Formation of the MILF and the 1987 Jeddah Accord.   
  
  
No sooner had the Tripoli Agreement been signed, than Marcos, who probably saw a way “ease 
out” of the original agreement and implement the agreement as he would have preferred it to be, 
insisted on holding a plebiscite on the essential provisions contained in the document. When the 
plebiscite produced the result Marcos wanted, and the validity/legality of the plebiscite has to be 
questioned, the fragile cease-fire collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost, and as 
many if not more refugees produced, huge amounts of ill-affordable money spent on armaments 
and equipment, and the dashed hopes of millions for a just and lasting peace were the costs that 
the Philippines paid from the 1972 declaration of martial law to the signing of the Tripoli 
Agreement.  
  
After the collapse of the Tripoli Agreement, many of the Bangsa Moro in the Southern Philippines 
felt that the MNLF, under the leadership of Nur Misuari was ineffective. Feeling betrayed by 
events, collaboration included, they called for his resignation. The bitter infighting in the MNLF 
which ensued, resulted in 1984 in the formation of a breakaway Bangsa Moro group, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), headed by the vice-chairman of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat. This 
new Muslim paramilitary group which had Islam as its official ideology, was equal to the task of 
continuing Marcos’ war. With the emergence of the highly organized MILF came solidarity with 
other Mujahideen (holy warriors), especially in Afghanistan, and in the early 1980s the MILF sent 
its most qualified combatants to the battlefields of Afghanistan   
  
The Bangsa Moro of the Southern Philippines from 1979 to 1984 were undergoing a 
transformation, insomuch that the MNLF opted for dialogue, whilst the MILF was opting for 
confrontation, stating there was no more point in talking, and the only course of action was to 
return to military action.(Alim 1995)  
  
With the lifting of martial law on 17 January 1981 it was to be expected that the Southern 
Philippines would return to some semblance of stability and freedom. It was not to be because 
many Muslims felt betrayed by the MNLF, who were seen as supporting Marcos, rather than 
supporting their cause. This mistrust in the MNLF leadership only sought to strengthen the MILF 
leadership of Hashim Salamat.   
  
Elections were held in early 1986, however the results were open to question, with widespread 
fraud and intimidation being suspected. Such was the controversy created by these election 
results, that a rebellion was sparked by Enrile and Ramos, and this in turn signaled the intention of 
Corazon Aquino to legally contest the election result. Eventually, after massive demonstrations by 
the Philippine populace, Marcos left the Philippines, and Corazon Aquino, assumed the 
presidency. Almost immediately, President Aquino sought advice from the OIC and the MNLF as 
to the best way of achieving a lasting peace in Mindanao.                          
  
As a consequence of seeking advice from the OIC, a conference was held in early 1987 in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia. In attendance were Nur Misuari, (chairman of the MNLF), and representatives from 
the Aquino administration and also the OIC. The basic provisions of the “Jeddah Accord”, which it 
was known as, were the same as that which was provided for in the Tripoli Agreement, however 
this time all of Mindanao, was to be included in the proposal for full autonomy, as well as Basilan, 
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan.  
  
Why then did this accord, with all its promise fail?  There might have been many reasons, such as 
the haste of the new administration to find an answer to the Bangsa Moro question. Or the 
inclusion of, and questionability of Nur Misuari as the chief MNLF negotiator, (bearing in mind that 
Misuari was the chief Muslim negotiator at the failed 1976 Tripoli Agreement). However, foremost 
would have been the Aquino administration’s failure to include the now highly organized MILF.   
  
  
  
The 1996 Peace Agreement and “11 September 2001”  
  
   
Aquino’s reluctance to accept that the MILF was more representative of the Bangsa Moro than the 
MNLF, and that Hashim Salamat was more acceptable to the majority of Philippine Muslims than 
was Nur Misuari, resulted in wide spread contempt for her administration that triggered renewed 
hostilities.   
  
President Aquino was to remain in power until 1992 when Fidel Ramos took over the presidency. 
Having come to power with a promise of achieving national reconciliation and peace Aquino 
achieved only had limited success in ensuring peace with the Bangsa Moro. Meanwhile the MILF 
was undergoing a highly organized structuring that included the formation of a Central Committee, 
headed by Chairman Hashim Salamat, and the appointments of Vice-Chairmen in areas of Military 
Affairs, Political Affairs, and Islamic Affairs. As well, ten committees were established covering, 
finance, intelligence, foreign affairs, health, military, information, education, religious and cultural 
affairs, communication, and transport, making the MILF an entity which was capable of forming a 
government if circumstances permitted. In addition, the MILF forces, now called the Bangsa Moro 
Mujahideen Army, was divided into Divisions, Battalions, and Composites, including Guerrilla 
Forces. All in all, approximately 120,000 fighters (Quimpo 2000).  
   
After the 1992 elections, Fidel Valdez Ramos became President.  Ramos, more so than his 
predecessors, realised the way to peace in Mindanao lay not only with peace agreements and 
cease fires but with a desire to eliminate poverty. Ironically, Ramos was now the second Philippine 
President to exclude the MILF from the renewed peace talks.  Ramos’ administration believed that 
the MILF and the MNLF were interchangeable, and as such negotiations with the MNLF would be 
automatically accepted by the MILF. At that time the MILF and the MNLF were antagonistic to 
each other and were in fact quite distinct geographically, and politically (McKenna 1998). Whilst 
the MNLF and the Ramos administration were negotiating the fledgling Muslim extremist group the 
Abu Sayyaf, which was formed in 1992, and was active in the islands of the Mindanao archipelago, 
now became active in the city of Zamboanga.   
  
The peace and reconciliation talks which Ramos held with the MNLF were by far the most 
comprehensive yet attempted, and lasted from 1992-1996. The talks covered wide ranging issues, 
including the establishment of Shari’ah courts, distribution of wealth from mines and mineral 
resources and a comprehensive administrative system, all of which was proposed in the 1976 
Tripoli Agreement, but not followed up. Nevertheless the Ramos administration signed a new 
agreement with the MNLF, which was called the 1996 Peace Agreement. Briefly the 1996 Peace 
Agreement, arranged for the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement in two phases. As well 
a transitional administrative structure known as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD) was formed, and its role was to supervise the implementation of the 
agreement during a three year period (McKenna 1998).   
  
Ramos lost the next presidential election to Joseph Estrada. Estrada, having been accustomed to 
the make-believe world of the theatre as a  “B grade film” actor, who had  turned president, 
embarked on a course of arrogance, abrasiveness and corruption which led to his downfall and 
arrest less than three years into his presidential term. When confronted with the demand/request, 
by the MILF for talks to discuss the possibility of Muslim independency in the Southern Philippines, 
reacted by retorting ‘over my dead body’, and followed up with ‘if they want war, I’ll give them war’. 
(Vitag & Gloria 2000) To the AFP soldiers in the field, it sounded like an oblique order, and they 
reacted accordingly.   
  
In January 2001 President Estrada was forced to resign through accusations of corruption, 
eventually being jailed in April 2001, and Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took over the 
presidency. No sooner had Arroyo taken charge than the Abu Sayyaf seized two American 
missionaries and eventually executed them. This now bought the US administration into the 
equation. The George W. Bush administration originally viewed the hostages as victims of crime, 
not terrorism. However, in a cruel twist of fate for the Bangsa Moro, the terrorist attacks in New 
York and Washington occurred on 11 September 2001. Because the terrorists who committed the 
attacks were recognized as militant Muslims, the Abu Sayyaf, and by association the MILF also, 
were tagged terrorist organisations and as such were now part of the “War on Terror” (Rogers 
2004).  In January 2002, 600 U.S. Troops were sent to the Southern Philippines as advisors to the 
AFP. As well as military advisors, the Philippine administration, received an infusion of $2.4 billion 
in security assistance, as part of new operations against Muslim insurgencies in Southeast Asia 
(Kho 2002). President Arroyo, during a visit to the U.S. convinced Washington to remove the MILF 
from the list of terrorist organisations targeted in the “War on Terror”. With the Philippine 
administration and the U.S. administration in agreement with each other regarding the “non-
terrorist” status of the MILF, peace talks could once again commence.  
  
Three major peace agreements, and independence and stability for the Bangsa Moro were still 
unattainable.   
  
  
Current Peace Talks  
  
  
In October 2001 the Arroyo administration and the MILF met for semi-formal talks; however these 
talks were suspended in March 2002 due to renewed hostilities, which coincided with the arrival of 
the 600 US military advisors.  However, it must have obvious to Arroyo after the resumption of 
formal talks with the MILF in Kuala Lumpur on 27/28 March 2003, that the road to peace and 
reconciliation, through dialogue with the MILF was going to be long and protracted.   
   
  
The First GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks: March 2003.  
  
  
“Exploratory Talks” was the term given to the first reconvened meeting, and up to the 8
th
 meeting 
held on 21 June 2005, the term has remained the same. If there was one area in which the first 
GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks fell short it was the failure to formally implement a ceasefire to end 
the then present hostilities. When questioned about this omission, by Minda News, Dureza said 
there was no need ‘because cessation of hostilities is already part of the previous agreements and 
the parties had agreed to honour past agreements’. As a result of the lack of formalization of a 
ceasefire no less than 528 “armed skirmishes” were recorded between 01 January-18 July 2003 
(Embassy of the Philippines, Washington)   
  
The Second and Third GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks: May 2003   
  
  
After the first GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, the Arroyo administration sought the help of the US 
Government in an advisory capacity. In May 2003 Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage 
announced that the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), would, in collaboration with the 
Malaysian Government, facilitate future peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF. 
Malaysia originally felt uncomfortable with a U.S. presence at the talks, fearing that it may escalate 
the conflict. As well, (Santos 2005), believed that ‘the U.S., being the superpower that it is, will 
always be the subject of theories of C.I.A. conspiracy and hidden agendas’. However, the USIP did 
became involved in the peace process, and to date is still encouraging the negotiation process in 
coordination with the Malaysian Government.  
  
  
The Fourth GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks: September 2003  
  
  
The GRP and MILF met for the fourth round of GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks on 5-6 September 
2003 in Kuala Lumpur. Both parties agreed to research the issue of ancestral domain before the 
next round of talks. As well, the MILF agreed to the suggestion by the GRP that the World Bank be 
approached for assistance to rebuild the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao, in the likely event of 
assigned final peace agreement. (The World Bank approved this request on 7 October 2003).   
  
The Fifth GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks: February 2004  
  
  
February 19-20 2004, saw the fifth round of GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks held in Kuala Lumpur. 
Both parties supported the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which would be used to rebuild 
war-torn areas of Mindanao in the future. As well, it was decided at this meeting to accept the 
recommendation of Malaysia and establish an International Monitoring Team (IMT), to observe the 
cease-fire agreement forged in July 2003. Having agreed to this recommendation from Malaysia 
the GRP and the MILF requested the Malaysian Government to send an advance survey team to 
the Southern Philippines as soon as possible (Islam online 2004) The IMT was to initially consist of 
personnel from Malaysia. As well a request was to be made to Indonesia, Libya, Saudi-Arabia, 
Bahrain, Brunei, and Japan to also send observers (Malayan News 2004).  
  
  
The Sixth GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks: December 2004  
  
  
Ten months were to elapse before the next GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks took place. It may have 
appeared to the international community that once again the fragile peace process in the Southern 
Philippines was stalling, however, there were many reasons for this delay, not the least being 
clashes between the AFP and MILF troops in Maguindanao, and the MILF’s insistence that AFP 
soldiers leave Buliok (a mountain complex near North Cotabato Province where the MILF had 
previously had a camp). As well, the MILF insisted that before the Exploratory Talks could begin 
again, criminal charges against a number of MILF leaders accused of being implemented in 
bombings in Davao City in 2002/2003 be dropped. Also, if ever an incident was going to incur the 
ire of the U.S. and interrupt the USIP initiated GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, it was the premature 
withdrawal of the small Philippine military force in Iraq. This incident also invoked the ire of the 
Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, who claimed the Philippines were giving into Terrorist 
demands (BBC News 2004). In an extraordinary comment from the Australian Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, he likened the Government of the Philippines to a marshmallow. The U.S.A. 
was more cautious in their response, with the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage saying 
he agreed with Zebari, but it would not affect relations with the Philippines. However, the BBC 
News, quoting a U.S. official, who agreed to speak on condition of anonymity, said ‘we have to re-
evaluate our overall relationship’.   
  
The sixth GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, which were held on 20-21 December 2005 were significant 
insomuch that for the first time it was agreed AFP and MILF armed regulars establish joint 
monitoring outposts in several conflict-prone areas. Spasmodic armed skirmishes were still 
occurring, (seventy-one were reported between 01 January and 30 December 2004), even though 
the IMT was formally deployed in Mindanao on 09 October of that year. As well, (and this would 
have significance internationally), the MILF reiterated at these talks, its complete opposition to 
terrorism and criminality.   
  
  
The Seventh GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks: April 2005  
  
  
Port Dixon, Malaysia, was the venue for the seventh GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks which were held 
on the 18/19/20 April 2005. These talks were widely reported on in the two major Philippine 
newspapers, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Philippine Star. The report in the Philippine 
Daily Enquirer is interesting, insomuch that it quotes the MILF’s leader, Murad Ebrahim, as saying 
the final aim of the peace process was to establish a Moro homeland in Mindanao. Given that the 
MILF’s former leader, Hashim Salamat, was insistent that complete independence was the only 
answer, why was the new leader of the MILF now only talking of a ‘Moro homeland’ in Mindanao? 
The answer might have been that the MILF was now prepared to settle for some form of autonomy 
within the Philippines rather than the establishment of an independent state, in return for major 
concessions, such as a sharing in mineral resources. Also, and this could indicate that an 
agreement had been reached at an informal level between the GRP and MILF, the USIP Executive 
Director, Eugene Martin, stated ‘independence is out of the question’ (personal communication).  
  
The important issue of ancestral domain was raised at these talks, and reported on in the 
Philippine Star on 19 April 2005. The Philippine Star defined ancestral domain as the cultural rights 
and property of ethnic Muslim tribes. As an indication of the importance of the question of 
ancestral domain in the negotiations, the USIP sponsored a four day workshop, on 24-27 May 
2005, in Davao City, on this very issue. Moreover, and this was the most crucial area in the 
ancestral domain debate, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, issued an official statement saying the panels 
have scored several consensus points on ancestral domain at the technical level which are 
acceptable under the Philippine Constitution (Office of the Press Secretary 2003).  
                       
In summing up the seventh GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, USIP, Eugene Martin, commented ‘it 
does look like they are making progress, although I believe they have a long hard slog ahead on 
governance which I define as devolution of power, “genuine” local autonomy, control over political 
processes and resources etc (personal communication).  
  
The Eighth GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks  
  
  
Kuala Lumpur was again the venue for the eighth GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, which were held 
on 20-21 June 2005. Unlike the seventh GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, this round of talks produced 
no new initiatives. However, it must be remembered that crucial ancestral domain talks were held 
only three weeks before this round of talks, and not enough time had elapsed for official reports to 
be completed.   
      
  
Summary of Current GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks  
  
  
The success to date of the GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks is due entirely to the goodwill of the 
following: not in order of importance. (1) The entire MILF organisation. (2) The Arroyo 
Administration. (3) The Government of Malaysia. (4) The USIP. (5) The OIC, in part. (5) The 
continuing efforts of the IMT. (6) The Philippine media, for accurate reporting. And (7) The World 
Bank for the offer of assistance for reconstruction of areas of Mindanao.        
  
It is important to put the role of the USIP, in the GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks into perspective. The 
USIP had as its executive director, Eugene Martin, a former deputy chief of the U.S. Embassy in 
Manila. Martin would already have been aware of the ethnic tensions in this country. The USIP, 
having facilitated the GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks since mid 2003, and having initiated the 
international ancestral domain talks in Davao City in May 2005, may well feel they are an 
essential, albeit inherent, part of the peace process in the Southern Philippines, but their 
importance may be overstated. When Rudy Rodil (head of the GRP Technical Committee at the 
GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks) was asked, what part the USIP played in the talks, his reply was 
they were ‘aware that it was there’ and ‘trying to make a mark in the peace process’, however, 
Rodil went on further to say the USIP is not let into the formal process for reasons of propriety 
(personal communication). !  
   
  
International Implications.  
  
  
 Although President Bush had agreed to exclude the MILF from the list of international terrorist 
organisations, and his administration had directed the USIP to facilitate the current GRP/MILF 
Exploratory Talks, the prospects for the MILF being “reinstated” into the terrorist organisation 
listing is very real if the talks falter. There is a belief that should the peace process fail then the 
MILF may resort to, a loose coalition with Jemaah Islamiyah. Zachary Abuza reported that when 
interviewing unnamed MILF officials, some saw Jemaah Islamiyah as fellow travelers, whilst others 
were more pragmatic and saw Jemaah Islamiyah as insurance, should peace talks fail. At the 
same time that Abuza was interviewing officials from the MILF, Joseph Mussomeli, the U.S 
embassy charge d’affaires in the Philippines, claimed that the island of Mindanao is becoming a 
haven to terrorists (ABC Radio Australia 2005) He went on further to say links between Jemaah 
Islamiah regional extremist network and Muslim rebels on Mindanao are growing. If this was not 
enough he warned that ‘the island runs the risk of becoming another Afghanistan’. When asked to 
substantiate his allegations, Mussomeli refused to elaborate. These claims were immediately 
refuted by Ignacio Bunye, a Philippine presidential spokesman, who said ‘Mindanao is being 
transformed from an area of conflict into an area of peace’. As well, MILF spokesman Eid Kabula 
said Mindanao will never be the similar to Afghanistan unless the U.S. makes it so by occupying 
Mindanao, as they have in Afghanistan (ABS-CBN Interactive 2005).  
  
This now raises the question of why would Abuza, a highly respected international reporter and 
expert on Asian affairs, and Mussomeli, a high ranking U.S diplomatic attaché, almost 
simultaneously made such provocative statements in the middle of very successful peace talks. 
Were they echoing official U.S. concerns, or just passing on private judgments? Time will have to 
be the arbiter. It is true, that in May 2003, when the Abu Sayyaf was kidnapping tourists, (including 
Americans) from various Asian locations, that the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, James A, 
Kelly, wrote to Hashim Salamat and demanded that the MILF sever its links with international 
terrorist organisations (Santos 2005). However Kelly assumed that because the Abu Sayyaf and 
the MILF were Muslim organisations, then there was solidarity between them. This was just not the 
case.  It is interesting to note that only six weeks before Abuza and Mussomeli made their 
comments, President Arroyo, at the beginning of the 5
th
 GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks, said ‘the 
level of violence has been reduced to almost nil and international confidence is high’ (Islam Online 
2004).   
  
The OIC, which played a leading role in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1987 Jeddah Accord, 
and to a lesser extent the 1996 Peace Agreement, have been prepared to “sit on the fence” and 
observe the proceedings of the current GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks. There may be many reasons 
why they are not actively involved in these talks. Firstly would be the USIP’s role as facilitator. 
Although there may be no antagonism between the OIC and the USIP, there can only be one 
facilitator at any time. However the OIC is closely monitoring the talks and during its Islamic 
Conferences of Foreign Ministers and its Islamic Summits of Kings and Heads of States, has an 
agenda item “Resolutions on the Question of Muslims in the Southern Philippines (Santos 2005). 
Secondly, the OIC had originally given official recognition to the MNLF as the leading organisation 
representing the Bangsa Moro, and has now to accept that MILF has taken on that role. The OIC 
may have to concede that in the 1996 Peace Agreement they were wrong in their choice of the 
MNLF as representatives, rather than “backing” the MILF. Or, thirdly, as Santos suggests that 
‘after more three decades, there is some fatigue in the OIC in dealing with the problem’.   
  
Finally, in the USIP’s special report 131, issued in February 2005, it was reported that the U.S. 
Administration views a settlement with the MILF as a means to contain Islamic extremism in 
Southeast Asia. It went on further to say that a settlement with the MILF will be a big boost to the 
global War on Terror. This, statement no doubt was a relief to the Arroyo administration, who 
would not want under any circumstances, to have 4 million of its population either wittingly or 
unwittingly “enemies” of the U.S.A.     
          
Concluding Thoughts  
  
  
To achieve a lasting peace in the Southern Philippines, there is no doubt many political scenarios 
which could be put forward. It would be desirous if there was only one voice to represent the 
Bangsa Moro. The MNLF could reunify with the MILF giving the Bangsa Moro a universal 
representation. This reunification was first mooted by Hashim Salamat in 2001, but nothing 
concrete came of his suggestion. Nur Misuari, the chairman of the MNLF is currently in jail, 
awaiting trial on rebellion charges, which resulted from attacks in 2001, which were designed to 
delay elections in the ARMM. His incarceration further complicates the question of reunification 
between the MILF and the MNLF, because if he is found guilty, this could lead to the MNLF being 
declared a terrorist group.  
  
 Leaving aside the prospect of a unified Muslim voice at this time, and looking at a possible 
political solution to the problems in the Southern Philippines, there only appears to be three 
scenarios which would possible, and they are, (1) a totally independent state, (2) a government 
with “mixed member proportional with dual constituencies”, or (3) a federal parliamentary system.   
  
(1) Totally Independent State   
  
  
This scenario is not without merit. Mindanao could be divided in two, with the western provinces, 
including the islands of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and Basilan forming an Islamic State, and the eastern 
provinces of Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Agusan del Sur, and Agusan del 
Norte remaining as Philippine sovereign territory, Under such a division, migration would be 
inevitable in the initial stages, and this may involve problems. The division of an island state into 
two separate countries may seem radical, but it is not unique. The Caribbean island of Hispaniola 
is divided into the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The island of Timor is divided, although this did 
involve bloodshed.  
  
The creation of a totally independent Islamic State may sound feasible, and even desirable. The 
reality of this ever occurring is remote. Rodil stressed that independence was out of the question. 
Zachary Abuza, in his role as a senior fellow with USIP, claimed the MILF for all intents and 
purposes has abandoned their demand for an independent state and are pushing for “meaningful 
autonomy”. However the possibility of an independent Islamic State, although remote, still can not 
be ruled out completely. In an interview with Antonio Lopez, from Asiaweek, in 2000, the MILF 
chairman, the late Salamat Hashim compared East Timor with the situation in Mindanao. He said 
‘if East Timor became independent, why not our people’.   
  
  
(2) Mixed Member Proportional with Dual Constituencies   
  
  
This relatively new form of government has been in place in New Zealand since 1993. It has many 
advantages insomuch that minorities are guaranteed representation even if they are 
geographically dispersed.  Apart from giving representation to the Muslims in the Southern 
Philippines, the Muslims in Luzon and the Visayas would have representation if they the chose to. 
This form of government would also give representation to the Lumads: the original indigenous 
inhabitants of Mindanao. Another advantage of this form of government is that a minority can have 
separate representation without being politically marginalized. As well the minority has a 
‘guaranteed level of descriptive representative without risking loss of substantive influence’ (Nagel 
1995). To enable “mixed member proportional with dual constituencies” to be the form of 
government in the Philippines would require a change to the Philippine constitution, by 
referendum. This may have a chance of success if there was consensus with the incumbent 
government and the Catholic Church.   
  
(3) Federal Parliamentary System  
  
   
Finally, a federalist form of government for the Philippines has the best chance of ensuring a 
lasting peace for the following reasons. It is advocated by certain sections of the Muslim and 
catholic populations as not necessarily in response to the problems in Mindanao, but ‘as a reaction 
to the overly Manila-centered workings of government in general’ (Quimpo 2000). As well, the 
Philippine President, Gloria Arroyo, has announced that a constitutional convention will be called in 
2006, to advocate a shift to a Federal Parliamentary system. Whatever form this takes is unclear at 
this time.  And, whether the constitutional convention is ever to take place has also to be bought 
into the equation. Arroyo is facing impeachment charges, for alleged election fraud, and should 
they be proven, and Arroyo is dismissed from office, then the presidency would go to the vice-
president, Noli de Castro, a former talk-back radio broadcaster. Like the former President Estrada, 
de Castro has little government knowledge, and was elected on his popularity rather than his 
administrative abilities.        
  
If federalism is to be the new form of government in the Philippines, then the reconstructed country 
might take a form such as this. The Philippines could consist of ten states, four in Luzon, Three in 
the Visayas, and three in Mindanao. Nine out of the ten states could be predominately Catholic, 
and one state predominately Muslim (in Mindanao). Obviously the Muslim state in Mindanao would 
have to encompass Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.    
  
Addendum  
  
  
The peace process covered in this paper was up until the end of the eighth GRP/MILF Exploratory 
Talks, which concluded on 21 June 2005. The ninth talks were due in July. However the crisis in 
the Arroyo administration, pending impeachment charges, may have the effect of stalling, if not 
stopping the peace process. Arroyo’s advisor on the peace process, Teresita Deles, has stepped 
down. The government’s chief peace negotiator, Silvestre Afable, has resigned. Informal talks on 
ancestral domain have been postponed for unspecified reasons. And, the vice chairman of the 
MILF, Ghadzali Jaafar, has stated that the Arroyo crisis has affected the talks.   
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